This insight was first published on The CorporateDispatch.Com Week of the 12th October and is written by Ci Consulta GeoPolitics Consultant Matthew Bugeja.
Sometimes, when reading about Turkey and its outspoken leader, President Erdogan, I am taken back to a comedy skit by Chris Rock. In one of his performances, Rock jokingly asks: “What do women want? Everything.” Whilst I will not be going into the merits of that statement, as my wife does read my work, Rock’s joke reminds me of Turkey’s Erdogan. What does he want?
In short – everything. It wants to be part of NATO, but only in relation to certain issues. It wants to be close to Russia, but does not want Russia to overly dominate the Middle East. It wants to be seen as the leader of the Muslim world, but it wants to be part of the European Union. It wants to eliminate what it views as the Kurdish threat within Syria’s borders, but it does not want ISIS to re-emerge as a threat in the neighbouring country.
How can it reconcile all these different goals? In truth, it cannot.
President Erdogan is one of the most active players in foreign policy anywhere in the world – certainly amongst mid-range global powers. But he suffers from a fundamental problem that not many of his peers have to worry about to such a degree – his country’s economy. Due to US tariffs and sanctions put on the country last year, Turkey’s economy went into a downspin. Its currency hit its weakest level in four months shortly after the incursion into Syria began. Its economy is currently in a weak spot, and inflation has only recently been brought under control. It is not too dissimilar from reentering a house immediately after its been on fire, you might want to give it some time before you try to re-enter the building. Similarly, Turkey is undertaking a military campaign at a time in which it will be under close scrutiny from Washington DC, and facing strong opposition from a highly motivated Kurdish force seeking to make their lives difficult. There is always a chance the military action goes badly, requiring further money and time, at a time in which its economy can ill-afford the expense.
This incursion has several aims, all of which are controversial. On the one hand, it is seeking to carve out an enclave in the country in which its military engineers would construct towns and villages for Syrian refugees who are currently in Turkey, to allow them to return. On the other, it would also provide an opportunity for Ankara to rid what they view is a potential threat of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish armed group who fought the Syrian army and ISIS alike, but are also alleged to be allied to the YPG, a militant Kurdish group who has long waged an insurgency in Turkey against the government to obtain an autonomous region. Erdogan’s ability to convince President Trump to remove his protection from the SDF is a masterstroke from his perspective, but a disaster for Washington’s relationship to the Kurds as a whole.
What we can gather from Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years points to Ankara’s desire to be far more active in the region than it has traditionally been. Erdogan has arguably consolidated his grip over power domestically, although there are signs that his popularity is weakening, and has shown an appetite to reestablish Turkish dominion over the Middle East once again, albeit in a more indirect manner than what the Ottoman Empire of yesteryear had exercised. This partially explains why Turkey has moved away from its links as a NATO ally, and cosied up to Russia, which has controversially provided Ankara with sophisticated Russian-made anti-aircraft systems which are incompatible with NATO’s systems, drawing an uproar in Brussels and Washington alike. But Erodgan also correctly calculated that Vladimir Putin is a more important, and involved player in the Middle East than the West currently is, and as such, it made more sense to be involved with Russia than the West.
In addition to its endeavours in the Middle East, Turkey is also handling the fallout from the various wars in the region, not least that of Syria. Millions of Syrians have been displaced, who have sought to cross into Europe. But the path from Syria to Europe can often take the refugees through Turkey, who currently have some 3.6 million refugees in their borders. It had previously reached a deal with the European Union to house and look after these refugees, but that agreement is subject to the whims of both sides. Recently, Erdogan threatened to send these refugees into Europe if the EU were to declare the Turkish incursion into Syria as being unlawful. The EU knows that it can ill-afford to receive such a large number of refugees, given its current struggles with the rise of far-right nationalists across the bloc. Erdogan holds the cards here, and Brussels knows it, which is why they will seek to appease him behind closed doors.
Turkey is currently on the rise, given its pro-active foreign policy – but it also faces a weak economy which is highly dependent on trade with Western powers and access to Western markets. So while it is strong, it is also vulnerable.
President Erdogan’s ambitions are certainly… ambitious, but too much ambition may also come at a financial and economic cost which will weaken him domestically, putting any foreign adventures on hold. He will need to balance these elements carefully, although he has long since thrown caution to the wind. The Turkish leader may want everything – but everything has a price, and right now, he’s paying on his credit card. That bill will come due.
Matthew Bugeja
